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II.

IMPLIED CONDITION OF EXISTENCE.

As is pointed out by Mr. Benjamin, in his Treatise on Sales,
book 1, part 1, ch. 9, what is often called an implied warranty
of existence is really not a warranty or agreement collateral to the
contract at all, but is in reality a condition precedent to any
contract; for unless the subject-matter exist at the time stipulated for the transfer the contract can never become executed.
Therefore nothing more need here be said about it. See, however,
Terry v. Bissell, 26 Conn. 23, remarks of ELLSWORTH, J.
III. SALE OF GOODS BY DESCRIPTION.

(a) Sale of Cliattels.
Where an article is sold by any description or particular
designation there is always an implied condition that the article
delivered shall correspond strictly with the description. This is
often, particularly in America, called an implied warranty. In
reality, however, it is obvious that it is no warranty at all, but
one of the coniditions precedent to the contract of sale. The
distinction is very clearly pointed out by Lord ABINGER, in
Vos. XXXI.-20
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Uhanter v. Hopkins, 4 M. & W. 399, quoted by Mr. Benjamin in
his book on Sales: "A good deal of confusion has arisen," said he,
"in many of the cases upon this subject, from the -unfortunate use
made of the word warranty. Two things have been confounded
together. A warranty is an express or implied statement of something which a party undertakes shall be part of a contract, and,
though part of the contract, collateral to the express object of it.
But in many of the cases, the circumstance of a party selling a
particular thing by its proper description has been called a warranty, and the breach 0 such a contract a breach of warranty;
but it would be better to distinguish such cases as a non-compliance
with a contract which a party has engaged to fulfil; as if a man
offers to buy peas of another and he sends him beans, he does not
perform his contract; but that is not a warranty; there is no
warranty'thathe should sell him peas; the contract is to sell him
peas, and if he sells him anything else in their stead it is a nonperformance of it."
In America the distinction between a warranty and this condition
in the contract does not appear to have been very carefully regarded
by the judges in their opinions, but they have usually confounded
this condition with an implied warranty. The consequence is, there
is much confusion of the law on this subject.
In New York, however, in -eed v. Bandal (21 N. Y. 358),
WRIGHT, J., in a lengthy opinion took this distinction. The case
was an action for the breach of a contract to sell and deliver a crop
of tobacco growing on the land of the defendant. The contract
called for good tobacco, well cured and boxed in good conditionand when delivered it was bad, ill cured, shrunk, rotten and
sweaty. The plaintiffs accepted the tobacco, and retained it without notifying the defendants of its defects, and, seventeen months
after converting it, brought an action for breach of contract. The
court held the action not to lie, as there was no offer to return by
the vendee, and evidence of an intention to accept, &c. WRIGHT,
J., said: ",The stipulation in respect to the quality and condition
of the article, when delivered, constituted no express warranty.
The contract was executory, for the sale of 'a growing crop of
tobacco, to be delivered the spring following, well cured and in
good condition. The article bargained for, and to be furnished in
the future, was a merchantable crop of tobacco. This was what
the vendor agreed to sell and the vendee to purchase. It was the
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sale of a particular thing by its proper description merely; and
the descriptive words used for defining the thing agreed to be sold
were of the substance of the contract, not collateral to the main
object of it. * * * A warranty, then, cannot be predicated upon
the contract alleged in the complaint; and the rules of law by
which. the rights of the parties in respect to warranties are
regulated are inapplicable. A breach of the contract was not a
breach of warranty, but a mere non-compliance with the contract
that the defendant had agreed to fulfil. * * * The delivery of
property corresponding with the contrac is a condition precedent
to the vesting of the title in the vendee. The parties understand
that the vendee is not bound to accept the property tendered,
except upon this condition."
As we have said, however, the cases on this point usually have
gone on the theory of an implied warranty.
Thus in Winsor v. -Lombard,18 Pick. (Mass.) 59, SiiAw, 0. J.,
said: "The old rule upon this subject was well settled, that upon
a sale of goods, if there be no express warranty of the quality of
the goods sold, and no actual fraud, by a wilful misrepresentation,
the maxim caveat emptor applies. Without going at large into the
doctrine upon this subject, or attempting to reconcile all the cases,
which would certainly be very difficult, it may be sufficient to say
that, in this Commonwealth, the law has undergone some modifications, and it is now held, that without express warranty or actual
fraud, every person who sells goods of a certain denomination or
description, undertakes as part of his contract, that the thing
delivered corresponds to the description, and is in fact an article
of the species, kind and quality thus expressed in the contract of
sale. * * * The rule being, that upon a sale of goods by a written
memorandum or bill of parcels, the vendor undertakes, in the
nature of warranting, that the thing sold and delivered is that
which is described; this rule applies whether the description be
more or less particular and exact in enumerating the qualities of
the goods sold."
The following cases are illustrations of the general doctrine
in America:
In ,Seixas v. Wood, 2. Caines (N. Y.) 48 (1804), a contract was
made for the delivery of b5aziletto wood, and it was so advertised
and described in the invoice. A delivery was made of peachum
wood, much inferior in quality. There was no evidence of fraud or
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an express warranty, and it was held that an action on the case would
not lie, "for selling one wood for the other." KENT, Chancellor,
said: "If upon a sale, there be neither a warranty nor deceit, the
purchaser purchases at his peril. * * * The mentioning the wood
as braziletto wood in the bill of parcels, and in the advertisement
some days previous to the sale, did not amount to a warranty to
the plaintiffs. To make an affirmation at the time of the sale a
warranty, it must appear by the evidence to be so intended, and
not to have been a mere matter of judgment or opinion, and of
which the defendant haA no particular knowledge. Here it is
admitted the defendant was equally ignorant with the plaintiffs,
and could have had no such intention."
In Swett v. Colgate, 20 Johns. (N. Y.) 196 (1822), goods were
sent from England to Boston invoiced as barilla-barillabeing
a substance found in the Mediterranean Sea, near there manufactured, and containing soda or alkali, which is its only value,
being used in the manufacture of soap. On using prt of the
so-called barilla it was found to be a substance called kelp, which
greatly resembles barilla, but contains a very small quantity of
alkali. Kelp is made in Great Britain and cannot be distinguished
from barilla but by analysis. Barilla contains fifty per cent. of
alkali, and kelp but five per cent. Assumpsit was brought for
goods sold and delivered, and the court held the action would not
lie, there being no express warranty or bond. WOODWORTH, J.,
said: "By the common law, where there is no fraud or agreement
to the contrary, if the article turns out not to be that which it
was supposed, the purchaser sustains the loss; the rule is eaveat
emptor," and followed Seixas v. Wood, with approval.
It is submitted, however, that the law, though correctly stated
in Seixas v. Wood, was incorrectly applied to that case as well as
the case just referred to, and KENT, Chancellor, who delivered the
opinion in Seixas v. Wood, in his Commentaries, expresses a doubt
whether the maxim of caveat emptor was there correctly applied,
inasmuch as there was a description in writing of the article sold,
and we may add the doctrine of Seixas v. Wood, supra, and Sweet
v. Colgate, supra, has since frequently been doubted in New
York. See -Hawkins v. -Pemberton, 51 N. Y. 198; Dounce v.
-Dow, 64 N. Y. 411; and finally overruled in White v. 111iller,
71 N. Y. 129.
In the last case plaintiffs, being gardeners, purchased of defend-
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ants, for market cabbage, a certain variety of seed known as
"Large Bristol Cabbage." The seed sent was raised on "Bristol
cabbage stocks," and, being of a different character, was rendered
impure by the crossing of the varieties, and the plants raised were
worthless: Hteld, an action lay for breach of contract, as there was
an implied contract that the seller was bound to deliver in such a
case exactly what he had agreed to sell. ANDREWS, J., said:
"The doctrine that a bargain and sale of a chattel, of a particular
description, imports a contract or warranty that the article sold is
of that description, is sustained by a great mass of authority. The
cases of Seixas v. Wood, supra, and Swett v. Colgate, supra,
based mainly upon the authority of the case of Olhandelorv. Lopus,
Cro. Jac. 4, are, it must be admitted, adverse to this view. The
case of Chandelor v. Lopus has been overruled in England, and
the cases in this state referred to have been often questioned; and
Chancellor KENT, who took part in deciding Seixas v. Wood,
intimates in his Commentaries a doubt whether the case was correctly decided: 2 Kent Com. 479. The case of Hawkins v. Pemberton, 51 N. Y. 198, adopts as the law in this state the doctrine
upon this subject now prevailing elsewhere, that a sale of a chattel
by a particular description is a warranty that the article sold is of
the kind specified; and this case was recognised in -Dounce v. -Dow,
64 N. Y. 411' as modifying the doctrine of Seixas v. Wood, and
Swett v. Colgate. We think the modern doctrine upon the subject
is reasonable, and proceeds upon a just interpretation of the contract of sale."
In Wolcott v. Mount, 7 Yroom -(N. J.) 262, seed was stated to
be "early strap-leafed red-top turnip seed," and so sold. The seed
turned out not to be the kind sold, and of an inferior quality.
Held, if the statement expressed by the seller was part of the
contract (as found), and not mere matter of opinion, an action lay
for breach of contract. DEPUD, J., said : "The doctrine that on
the sale of a chattel, as being of a particular kind or description,
a contract is implied that the article is of that kind or description, is also sustained by the following English cases: Powell v.
Horton, 2 Bing. N. C. 668; Barr v. Gibson, 3 M. & W. 390;
Chanter v. Hopkins, 4 Id. 399; NYichol v. Godts, 10 Exch. 191;
Gompertz v. Bartlett, 2 E. & B. 849; Azemar v. Casella, Law
Rep., 2, C. P. 431; and has been approved by some decisions in
the courts of this country. * * * The right to repudiate the pur-
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chase for the non-conformity of the article delivered to the
description under which it was sold, is universally conceded.
That right is founded on the engagement of the vendor, by such
description, that the article delivered shall correspond with the description. The obligation rests upon the contract. Substantially,
the description is warranted. It will comport with sound legal
principles to treat such engagements as conditions, in order to afford
the purchaser a more enlarged remedy by rescission than he would
have on a simple warranty; but when his situation has been
changed, and the remedy by repudiation has become impossible,
no reason supported by principle can be adduced, why he should
not have upon his contract such redress as is practicable under the
circumstances. In that situation of affairs the only available
means of redress is a legal action for damages. Whether the action
shall be technically considered an ction on a warranty, or an
action for the non-performance of a contract, is entirely immaterial."
Here, Seixas v. Wood and Swett v. Colgate were commented on.
In Hardy et al. v. 1iarbanks et al., James (Nova Scotia) 432, it
was held that the sale of No. 1 salmon, without express warranty,
amounts to a warranty that the fish is in the condition prescribed
by law for the fish of that brand.
In Baker et al. v. Ljman, 38 Upper Canada Q. B. 498, an order
was sent by plaintiffs, potters, in England, to the defendants, at
Toronto, for "stone spar such as potters use." The order was
entered on the books for stone, but defendant's manager erased it,
and put "ground flint," thinking that was what was meant. It
appeared that spar was used in the United States for the same purposes as the stone in England. The flint was sent in a barrel, and
said by defendants to be marked "one barrel flint," but, at all
events, was entered by a station master in England as " one barrel
fluid." There was nothing to distinguish the flint from the stone
on mere inspection, and plaintiffs, using it, thereby suffered a loss
in their ware. In an action by them, the court below directed the
jury that defendants were liable if the order sent by plaintiffs
should have been understood by defendants as an order for stone,
and if the plaintiffs were justified in believing that the article sent
was such stone; but that if defendants were justified in sending
ground flint on the order received, they were not liable. The jury
found for the plaintiffs. A nonsuit was afterwards ordered, but on
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appeal it was held the direction to the jury was right, and that the
verdict should have been upheld.
In Henshaw v. .Robins, 9 Mete. (Mass.) 88, the sale was, inter
alia, of "two cases of Manilla indigo, of superior quality," previous to the sale the goods being opened and inspected. .Reld, the
bill may be considered as a warranty that the goods sold are as
described in it, and this is so, whether the goods are inspected or
not, if the buyer cannot tell from their appearance whether they
are what he intended to buy or not. WmIDE, J., said : "From a
review of these authorities, we think the weight of authority is
manifestly in favor of the law as established in this Commonwealth;
and it seems to us to be founded on sound principles. The plaintiff, therefore, is entitled to recover, unless, by the examination
of the article purchased, he is to be considered as having waived
But we are of
his right to indemnity under the warranty. * *
opinion that the examination of the article by the plaintiff, atthe
time of the sale, is no evidence of his intention to waive any legal
right. If the spurious nature of the article might have been
detected on inspection, it might have been otherwise." Osgood v.
Lewis, 2 Har. & G. (Md.) 495; Borrekins v. Bevan, 3 Rawle
(Pa.) 23; Hastings v. Lovering, 2 Pick. (Mass.) 214, were cited
with approval, and Swett v. Colgate, 20 Johns. (N. Y.) 196, and
Seixas v. Wood, 2 Caines (N. Y.) 48, were commented upon.
In Osgood v. Lewis, 2 Har. & G. (Md.) 495, oil was described
in the bill of parcels as "winter-pressed sperm oil," but on delivery
it turned out to be "summer-pressed" and not "winter-pressed,"
and of an inferior description. It was held on appeal, reversing
the court below, that an action lay for a breach of the contract;
here Seixas v. Wood and Swett v. Colgate were disapproved.
In Foos v. Sabin, 84 Ill. 564, the contract of sale was for "fat
cattle," to be shippied for delivery af a future day. Held, where a
party contracts to sell "fat cattle," to be shipped for the market at
a future day, he will be bound to pasture them, &c., so that they
will, at the expiration of the time agreed on for delivery, be in a
suitable condition for sale as "ffat cattle" in the market.
In -Flint v. Lyon, 4 Cal. 17, there was a contract to deliver two
thousand barrels, described in the sold note as "HIaxall flour,"
and it was alleged to be performed by a delivery of "G allego
flour." There was apparently no difference between the values of
the two kinds, at that time. Held, an action lay for breach of

WARRANTIES IMPLIED IN SALES OF

contract. MURRAY, J., said: "It is a matter of no consequence
that there was at the time little or no difference between the prices
of Haxall and Gallego flour. What the inducement was to the
defendant to purchase, we know not; but having purchased that
particular brand, he was entitled to it, and could not be compelled
to accept any other as a substitute. The use of the word I Haxall'
in the sold note amounted to a warranty that the flour was I Haxall.' " See also, .ichmond Trading, &c., Co. v. Earquar,8 Blackf.
(Ind.) 89; Rogins v. Plympton, 11 Pick. 97; Bradford v. Mfanly,
13 Mass. 139; Hastings v. Lovering, 2 Pick. 214; Mader v.
Jones, 1 R. & 0. (Nova Scotia) 82; Wier v. Bissett, 2 Thomp.
(lb.) 178; Hyatt v. Boyle, 5 G. & J. (Md.) 110; Bryant v. Sears,
49 Iowa 373; Lamb v. Crafts, 12 Mete. (Mass,) 355; Bunnell v.
Whitlaw, 14 Upper Canada Q. B. 241.
In Pennsylvania, the authorities on this subject are not entirely
harnonious.
The earliest case, we are aware of, where the subject was elaborately discussed, is that of Borrekins v. Bevan et al., 3 Rawle
(Pa.) 23. It appeared that defendants had contracted to sell to
the plaintiffs, inter alia, a cask of "blue paint," and the bill of
sale offered in evidence ran : "Bought of Bevan & Porter, 4 casks
paint viz.: 1 cask blue wt.," &c., the paint was delivered, and
about a year afterwards was opened and found to be a different article,
and not merchantable as blue paint. On an action to recover back
the purchase-money, the lower court charged the jury, the law
was, that the plaintiff could not recover, unless an express warranty or fraud were proven; that a description in a bill of parcels
of an article sold, as blue paint, does ujot amount to a warranty
that it is so; and that in order to support his action, it is incumbent
on the plaintiff to show, that before bringing suit, he tendered or
redelivered the article to the defendants. After the case had been
elaborately argued on appeal, the court below was reversed, ROGERS,
J., saying: "According to the modern cases, warranties are divided
into two kinds; express warranties, where there is a direct stipulation, or something equivalent to it, and implied warranties, which
are conclusions and inferences of law, from facts, which are
admitted, or proved before the jury. If the learned judge intended
to say, that there can be no warranty, without an express agreement,
or stipulation, or there be fraud, then his opinion is in opposition
to the whole current of modern dgcisions. It must now be taken
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to be the law (for they have conceded this in England, and even in
New York, where the cases of (ihandelor v. Lopus, and Seixas v.
Wood, were decided), that where property is sold by sample, there
is an implied warranty, that the article corresponds with the sample,
although it has at the same time been held, it is sufficient if the bulk
corresponds with the sample. * * * From a critical examination
of all the cases, it may be safely ruled, that a sample, or description
in a sale note, advertisement, bill of parcels, or invoice, is equivalent to an express warranty, that the goods are what they are
described or represented to be by the vendor. In the absence of
proof to rebut the presumption, it is of equal efficacy to charge
the vendor, as if the seller had expressly said 'I warrant them
to correspond with the description or representation.' * * * To
fix the precise meaning of the judge, in this part of his charge,
has been attended with some difficulty. I understand him, in effect
to say, that even if the defendants sold, and the plaintiffs purchased,
the article for blue paint, it does not amount to a warranty if, on
delivery, it turns out to be an entirely different commodity.
* * * In all cases where it does not correspond in kind,
the purchaser has a right to say this is not the article I contracted for, non in haec fwedera veni, and this, whether he
complains at the time of delivery or after, unless his conduct amounts to a waiver of his right to indemnity. * * * As
a general rule I do not mean to impugn the doctrine, that in
sales of personal property the vendor is not answerable for any
defects in the quality of the article sold, without an express warranty or fraud. But it must be admitted that the rule is qualified
with many exceptions, * * * in addition to those to which I have
particularly adverted. * * * It has been said that the doctrine
only applies to executory contracts, but it will be obs.erved that all
the cases are actions on the implied warranty, where the contract
has been executed, either at the time or afterwards, by payment
of the money and delivery. * * * In all sales, therefore, there is
an implied warranty that the article corresponds in specie with the
commodity sold, unless there are some facts and circumstances
existing in the cases, of which the jury under the direction of the
court are to judge, which clearly show that the purchaser took upon
himself the risk of determining not only the quality of the goods,
but the kind he purchased, or where he may waive his right.
* * * The court further instructed the jury that in order to supVOL. XXX-21
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port the action it is incumbent on the plaintiff to show, that before
bringing suit he tendered or redelivered the article to the defendants. If this had been an action to rescind there would be no
doubt the charge would have been right in this particular. And
this was formerly so on an express warranty; but it has been since
ruled that an action will lie without a return or offer to return the
property. And in this respect I see no difference between an
express and implied warranty." In this case Swett v. Colgate,
supra, Seixas v. Wood, suvra, and Chandelor v. Lopus, Oro. Jac.
4, were disapproved. GIBSON, C.J., and KENNEDY, J., dissented.
This case was followed by Jennings v. Gratz, 3 Rawle 168.
There plaintiffs, auctioneers, exposed for sale certain teas, described
as "Young Hyson Tea." On delivery it was discovered the tea
was adulterated, and defendants declined to pay, and refused to
receive them. Held, that if the tea, by adulteration, had not lost
its distinctive character as "Young Hyson Tea," an action lay for
the price. The court said: "In the case at bar the teas were
proved to be adulterated with certain leaves which it is believed do
not belong to the tea family. But it was also shown, that no teas
of the same denomination are entirely free from adulteration by
admixture of these same leaves; and if a small degree of adulteration were permitted to affect the question of specific character,
there would seldom be a binding sale. * * * Adulteration may,
however, be carried so far as to destroy the distinctive character
of the thing altogether; and in doubtful cases there is perhaps no
practical test but that of its being merchantable under the denomination affixed to it by the seller. The application of this test to
the case at bar produces a result decisively unfavorable to the
defendant. The teas were resold at prices not greatly reduced, to
dealers, although put on their guard it may be presumed by the
defendant's repudiation of the article."
In Fraley v. Bisykam, 10 Penn. St. 320, "it seemed from the
charges for the boxes of samples," says the reporter, "that the sale
in this case was made by sample." At all events it appears that,
by the bill of sale, Fraley bought of Bispham "50 hhds. Superior
Sweet-scented Kent'y Leaf Tobacco," which on examination turned
out to be Kentucky leaf of exceedingly bad quality-low, heated,
faded, rotten-not superior sweet-scented Kentucky leaf, and unfit
for the consumption in England, where it was ordered to be sent.
An action was brought for money had and received, and plaintiff
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was nonsuited. On appeal the action of the court below was confirmed. COULTER, J., said: " The cause seems to be conclusively
governed by the case of Borrekins v. Bevan, 3 Rawle 23, * * *
where "the rule established that in all sales of goods by bills of
parcels, samples, &c., there is an implied warranty that the article
delivered shall correspond in specie with the commodity sold, unless
there are facts and circumstances to show that the purchaser took
upon himself the risk of the kind as well as the quality of the
commodity purchased. If that case means anything it means this,
that where the thing is sold by sample, and without express warranty, the purchaser takes it at his own risk, unless it should prove
to be an article different in kind; all gradations in quality are at
the hazard of the buyer. But if an article was sold as a diamond,
and turned out to be glass, or where the thing was sold as tea, and
was in fact chaff, the vendor would be responsible. * * * The sale
by the bill of parcels, with which the sample perhaps corresponded,
was of sweet-scented Kentucky leaf tobacco. It is not pretended
that the article delivered was not tobacco, nor that it was anything
else than Kentucky leaf tobacco. The gist of the whole case on
the part of the plaintiffs is that the tobacco delivered was not of a
quality equal to the sample, but of inferior flavor, taste and quality.
It was in specie Kentucky leaf tobacco, in kind the same as the
article sold."
In Dailey v. Green, 15 Penn. St. 118, a contract was made for
the delivery of timber of a particular quality, &c., for building
boats. The court said: "By his agreement to deliver in accordance
with the order, the plaintiff in effect warranted the timber delivered
should be accordant with that described in the order; for in a sale
of goods by sample, or upon a written contract of articles of a
particular description, which the purchaser had no opportunity of
inspecting, the law implies a warranty that the article shall answer
the description in the written contract." Fraley v. Bispham,
supra, was not cited.
Carson v. MfcKnight, 19 Penn. St. 375, was the sale of a
specific article ascertained before the sale by the purchaser.
Wetherill v. .Neilson, 20 Penn. St. 448, and Witaker v. Eastwick, 75 Id. 229, will be found difficult to reconcile with Pennsylvania or other cases. The former was an action on a note given
for a bill of goods, which ran as follows: "Bought of Thomas
Neilson, 35 casks of Soda Ash, 48 pr. ct., weighing as follows
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304 to 338 (inclusive), each cask having its weight set down, &c."
On the trial it was proved that Neilson's broker got a specification
from him of 35 casks of soda ash, afloat, of 48 degrees strength,
English test; that the sale was made by the broker on the distinct
understanding that the soda was 48 degrees English test; that he
was authorized to represent the soda as of that test. The defendants* offered further 'to prove that the soda ash was far below the
48 pr. ct. agreed upon in the contract, and was unmerchantable,
not being what it was sold for. This was rejected by the court.
They further offered to show that it was so far below the English
test as to be useless for what it is usually sold, and that there was
a custom of the trade at the place of contract, to the effect that
soda psh is sold upon the representation of the seller as to the percentage of alkali contained in it, without sample or warranty, and
that the soda in question was sold on such representation. All
this the court rejected, and on appeal was affirmed.
In Whitaker v. .Eastwicek, supra, plaintiffs purchased a cargo of
coal, without seeing it, on the representationof the defendant that,
it was "good coal well adaptedfor generating steam." On a suit
to recover back the price, the plaintiff offered to show that there
was at least twenty per cent. of slate and dirt in it, and that it
was unmerchantable, which offer was admitted by the court. On
appeal the action of the lower court was reversed, MERCUR, J., say-

ing: "It is well settled as a general rule that the purchaser takes
the risk of the quality of an article purchased, unless there be fraud
or warranty. In this case no fraud is alleged, and there was no
express warranty. The action is assumpsit on an implied warranty. There is an implied warranty of title, and generally of
species, in a sale, but not of quality. * * * They got the kind
of coal for which they bargained. * * * The fact that it was represented as being well adapted for generating steam, and that by
reason of its impure quality a larger quantity is required to
generate a given amount of steam, are all insufficient to raise an
implied assumysit."
In Warren v. Philadelphia Coal Co., 3 Weekly Notes of Cases
(Phila.) 525, C., having previously sold coal to W., offered him a
lot at a certain price, and on W.'s inquiring of the quality, informed
him it was as good as the former lot; thereupon W. purchased it.
Held, evidence was admissible to show the coal was not so good as
the former.
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In Scheppers v. Stewart, 11 Weekly Notes of Cases (Phila.)
106, an action to recover the price of a reed-making machine, the
defendant in his affidavit of defence set up that the machine when
shown him was in a dark room, and he was unable to examine it
thoroughly, but was obliged to rely on the representations of the
plaintiff's salesman, which proved to be untrue in many specified
particulars, and that the machine had not been delivered. The
court below allowed the case to go to the jury, and the court, on
appeal, upheld their action.
In Havemeyer v. Wright, not yet reported, tried during the
current year in the Circuit Court of the United States for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, plaintiffs contracted to deliver.
to defendants a certain quantity of "old rails," and in fulfilment
of their contract offered to deliver a quantity of "new rails,"
which, proving worthless, defendants declined to receive, and
rescinded the contract. In an action for the price, plaintiffs contended that " old rails" were substantially the same commodity as
"new rails," and that a contract for "old rails" was satisfied by a
delivery of "new rails." It was shown, however, that "old rails"
had a special signification in the trade, and were principally of
value because, having been used, their quality had been tested ;
that "old rails" were, in short, a particular commodity, different
from "new rails." MCKENNAN, C. J., substantially charged the
jury that there were two questions to consider: The first was,
whether, assuming that "old rails" had a special value from having
been used, the term "old rails," in a commercial sense, included
"new rails," and the two things were substantially the same commodity; and, secondly, even if the two were the same commodity,
were these "new rails" delivered merchantable, or were they so
worthless as to be unmerchantable as "old rails." Verdict and
judgment for defendants. BUTLEi, D. J., concurred.
The rule deducible from these cases may then be thus stated:
Where goods are sold by a particular description or designation,
the goods delivered must strictly correspoihd with that designationor
description. In England this is put, as we have stated, on the
ground that the identity of the goods described and bargained for,
with those delivered, is a condition precedent to the contract. In
America it is usually on that of an implied warranty. In both countries the result reached is the same. It is true that there are some
cases in Pennsylvania which are in antagonism with this rule, but
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the cases in that state cannot all be reconciled with each other, as
we have seen with respect to Neilson v. Wetherill, supra, and
Whitaker v. Eastwick, supra, and the other Pennsylvania cases
quoted by us, and it would not be safe to say what the law in that
state on this subject is.
(b) Sale of Negotiable Instruments, &c.
In the same category of cases as those we have just discussed
fall those in which the courts have said, that in a sale of securities,
maps, books, &c., by prospectuses, the seller is bound to deliver an
article strictly corresponding to the description; and these authorities, like those we have just reviewed, are usually put, in America,
on the ground of an implied warranty, and not generally on that
of a condition precedent.
Thus in lferriam v. Wolcott, 3 Allen (Mass.) 258, the plaintiff
had purchased of the defendant two promissory notes, for a sum
less than their face value, both of which, without the knowledge
of the parties, had forged endorsements. Held, an action would
lie to recover back the money.
In Lobdell v. Baker, 1 Metc. (MJass.) 193, the note was endorsed
by a minor, and it was held that upon the sale there was an implied
warranty that the endorsement was by one capable of binding himself by a valid contract.
In Terry v. Bissell, 26 Conn. 23, defendants sold the plaintiffs
a note not then due purporting to be signed by A., and endorsed
by G. & S. The signature cf A. was genuine, but those of G. &
S. forged. Both parties were ignorant of the forgery. On the
discovery of the forgery, plaintiffs offered to return the note, which
defendants declined to receive. Held, an action lay for money
had and received. ELLSWORTH, J., said: "In the first place, there
was no sale, because the subject-matter of the sale had no existence
* * * the existence of the thing to be sold, or the subject-matter
of the contract, is essential to the validity of the contract. If a
horse which has died, a fact unknown by the parties, is sold at the
present time, or goods which have been burned, the sale is not good,
for the very basis of the negotiation and transfer is wanting.
Indeed it is clear law that if a substantial part of the thing sold be
non-existent, there is no sale. * * * The signatures of Mr. Gorton and Mr. Smith, which alone gave value and credit to the note,
not being legally attached to the note, it is not the thing which
was negotiated for between the parties, any more than the dead
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horse can he said to be the horse sold, because the lifeless body
remains, and the hide and shoes are of some little value. The
names of Mr. Gerton and Mr. Smith are no more on the note than
if nothing was written on it at all, and without these names the
thing is substantially wortiless. * * * We think the purchaser
was entitled to have a thing of the kind and description which the
thing sold purported and was understood to be." See also Ross v.
Terry, 63 N. Y. 613; .lllis v. Grooms, 1 Stewart (N. J.) 47;
Paitiks et al. v. Kamp, 3 Fed. Rep. 898. Whether, however,
the thing is or is not what it really purports to be is undoubtedly
a question of fact for the jury to decide.
(e) ilerehantabilityimplied in a sale of Goods by Description.
In a sale of goods by description, where the goods have not been
inspected by the buyer, there is always, in addition to the condition
precedent above discussed, an implied warranty that they are merchantable, under the designation or description mentioned in the
sale. Thus in Gaylord 111anf. CJo. v. Allen, 53 N. Y. 518, ALLEN,
J., said: "A contract to manufacture and deliver an article at a
future day, carries with it an obligation that the article shall be
merchantable, or, if sold for a particular purpose, that it shall be
suitable' and proper for such purpose," quoting ifargous v. Stone,
I Selden 73; Reed v. Randall, 20 N. Y. 318; Dutekess v. Harding, 49 Id. 321. The same rule was laid down in lHfe Olung v.
Kelley, 21 Iowa 509, viz. : "The contract always carries with it an
obligation that the article shall be merchantable, at least not have
any remarkable defect." See also Hyatt v. Boyle, 5 Gill & J.
(Md.) 110.
In Hargows v. Stone, 1 Selden (N. Y.) 73, PAIGE, J., reviewed
at considerable length the cases in which were involved the principle of implied warranties in sales, and in speaking on this point
said, "executory sales do not depend on the same principle as
executed contracts of sale. The doctrine of implied warranty has
properly no application to the former. Whether a contract is
executory, that is, to deliver an article not defined at the time, on a
future day, whether the vendor has at the time an article of the
kind on hand, or it is afterwards to be procured or manufactured,
the contract carries with it an obligation that the article shall be
merchantable, at least of medium quality or goodness. If it comes
short of this the vendee may rescind the contract and return the
article after he has had a reasonable time to inspect it. He is not

